The development of adaptive conformity in young children : effects of uncertainty and consensus by Morgan, T.J. et al.
 1 
The Development of Adaptive Conformity in Young Children: 2 
Effects of Uncertainty and Consensus 3 
 4 
T. J. H. Morgan1,2*, K. N. Laland1 & P. L. Harris3 5 
 6 
1Centre for Social Learning and Cognitive Evolution, School of Biology, University of St Andrews, 7 
UK 8 
2Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, USA 9 
3Harvard Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, USA 10 
 11 
*corresponding author: thomas.morgan@berkeley.edu 12 
 13 
Research highlights: 14 
• Older children, but not younger children, use the decisions of others to improve their 15 
performance on number judgments. 16 
• Children are poor at using task difficulty to decide when to copy others. 17 
• Older children are highly sensitive to small majorities, whilst younger children are only 18 
influenced by unanimity. 19 
• Children have a tendency to stick with their own initial decisions no matter what others say. 20 
Abstract 21 
Human culture relies on extensive use of social transmission, which must be integrated with 22 
independently acquired (i.e., asocial) information for effective decision-making. Formal 23 
evolutionary theory predicts that natural selection should favor adaptive learning strategies, 24 
including a bias to copy when uncertain, and a bias to disproportionately copy the majority (known 25 
as ‘conformist transmission’). Although the function and causation of these evolved strategies has 26 
been comparatively well studied, little is known of their development. We experimentally 27 
investigated the development of the bias to copy-when-uncertain and conformist transmission in 28 
children from the ages of 3 to 7, testing predictions derived from theoretical models. Children first 29 
attempted to solve a binary-choice quantity discrimination task themselves using asocial 30 
information, but were then given the decisions of informants, and an opportunity to revise their 31 
answer. We investigated whether children's revised judgments were adaptively contingent on (i) the 32 
difficulty of the trial and (ii) the degree of consensus amongst informants. As predicted, older but 33 
not younger children copied others more on more difficult trials than on easier trials, even though 34 
older children also showed a tendency to stick with their initial, asocial decision. We also found that 35 
older children, like adults, were disproportionately receptive to non-total majorities (i.e., were 36 
conformist) whereas younger children were receptive only to total (i.e., unanimous) majorities. We 37 
conclude that, whilst the mechanism for incorporating social information into decision-making is 38 
initially very blunt, across the course of early childhood it converges on the adaptive learning 39 
mechanisms observed in adults and predicted by cultural evolutionary theory. 40 
 41 
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  46 
Introduction 47 
 48 
Cultural Evolutionary theory suggests that individuals should be selective with respect to when they 49 
adopt the decisions of others (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Rogers, 1988), and that natural selection 50 
will lead to the use of adaptive learning strategies that guide the use of social information (Boyd & 51 
Richerson, 1985; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Laland, 2004). Such 'social learning strategies' (also 52 
known as 'transmission biases', Boyd & Richerson, 1985) have been primarily examined through 53 
population genetic and game theory modeling (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Boyd & 54 
Richerson, 1985; Rogers, 1988; Feldman et al., 1996; Schlag, 1998, 1999; Wakano & Aoki, 2007; 55 
Enquist et al., 2007; Kendal et al., 2009; Nakahashi et al., 2012; Kandler & Laland, 2013), and 56 
through experiments with human adults (Mcelreath et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2008; Mesoudi, 57 
2008, 2011; Toelch et al., 2009, 2010; Morgan et al., 2011).  58 
 59 
One such bias – a tendency to copy others when uncertain as to how to solve the task at hand – has 60 
been a central assumption of theoretical models of cultural evolution. Boyd and Richerson (1988) 61 
modeled individuals in a spatially and temporally variable environment. They postulated than when 62 
asocially acquired information left individuals uncertain, they should adopt the decisions of others. 63 
Enquist et al. (2007) considered a related rule called “conditional social learning”, by which 64 
individuals first learn asocially, but go on to learn socially if the result of their asocial learning is 65 
unsatisfactory, an outcome that is likely on more difficult tasks. Their analysis found this rule to be 66 
a successful strategy across a range of conditions – particularly when asocial learning is relatively 67 
cheap (i.e., energetically undemanding and/or low risk) (Enquist et al., 2007). Evidence for a bias to 68 
copy others when uncertain also comes from empirical studies with non-human animals (van 69 
Bergen et al., 2004; Galef & Whiskin, 2008). In adult humans, across multiple tasks, individuals' 70 
confidence ratings in their performance strongly predicted whether they would revise their decision 71 
when presented with conflicting social information (Morgan et al., 2011; See et al., 2011; Soll & 72 
Mannes, 2011; Minson & Mueller, 2012). Furthermore, individual confidence ratings were shown 73 
to predict accuracy, supporting the notion that this strategy increases performance (Morgan et al., 74 
2011). 75 
 76 
Another well-studied learning rule is ‘conformist transmission’ – not to be confused with 77 
conformity more generally (i.e., the adoption of majority decisions). As defined by Boyd and 78 
Richerson (1985), conformist transmission refers to the disproportionately large influence of 79 
majorities on an individual's decision making. According to this strict definition, an individual is 80 
only defined as conformist if, given that they are otherwise naïve, the probability that they adopt the 81 
majority decision is greater than the size of the majority when considered as a proportion of the 82 
group of potential informants (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). To illustrate, consider a naïve individual 83 
choosing between options A and B who observes 7 informants advocating option A and 3 84 
informants advocating option B – thus, the (non-total) majority represents 70% of the group. In this 85 
case, if the probability that the individual chooses option A is greater than 0.7, they would be 86 
described as a conformist. If the probability that an individual adopts the majority decision is less 87 
than the size of the majority relative to the group, the individual is described as anti-conformist. In 88 
the hypothetical case, an anti-conformist would have a probability less than 0.7 (though potentially 89 
still >0.5) of choosing option A. Hence our use of the term 'anti-conformist' need not imply a 90 
preference for the minority behavior. Finally, if the probability of adoption is equal to the relative 91 
size of the majority (i.e., equal to 0.7 in the hypothetical scenario), then proportional or unbiased 92 
transmission will occur. Accordingly, conformists, proportional copiers and (some) anti-93 
conformists are all more likely to go along with the majority than the minority. However, the 94 
critical difference between them is in precisely how likely they are to do so. This difference is of 95 
importance because popular ideas and beliefs will spread to fixation in a population of conformists, 96 
whilst proportional transmission does not change the popularity of ideas and an anti-conformist 97 
population can either heterogenize, with all beliefs being equally frequent, or oscillate, with an 98 
endless succession of fads. Theoretical models suggest that conformist transmission, as defined 99 
above, is a highly effective strategy (Boyd & Richerson 1985), particularly favored in spatially 100 
variable environments, where there are errors in learning, and a greater number of options between 101 
which individuals choose. Nonetheless, conformist transmission can be disadvantageous in 102 
temporally variable environments because it hinders the initial spread of innovations (Nakahashi et 103 
al., 2012).  104 
 105 
Despite this theoretical background, the empirical evidence for conformist transmission in adults is 106 
mixed (Mcelreath et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2011; Morgan & Laland, 2012). 107 
A plausible explanation for this is that whereas models have considered the effect of social 108 
information separate from any other information sources, experimental work has typically studied 109 
the decisions of individuals following both social and asocial information and so theoretical 110 
predictions are less likely to hold. In support of this explanation, when other sources of influence 111 
are controlled for, there is strong evidence for a conformist response to consensus underlying 112 
human decision-making (Morgan et al., 2011). Thus while cultural evolutionary work has explored 113 
these issues using mathematical models and experimental studies involving adult participants, it has 114 
not greatly investigated the learning strategies of children. 115 
 116 
In contrast, there have been numerous recent studies on social learning in children within 117 
developmental psychology (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Corriveau & Harris, 2009a; b; Corriveau et al., 118 
2009a; b; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Kinzler et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2013; Fusaro & Harris, 2013), 119 
with findings germane to the development of these learning biases. First, there is evidence of 120 
uncertainty guided social learning in infants (Harris & Lane, 2013) and young children (Sobel & 121 
Kushnir, 2013). For example, infants are more likely to rely on guidance from others when they 122 
encounter an uncertain as opposed to an unambiguous situation. Thus, 12- and 16-month-olds look 123 
more rapidly and more often at nearby adults, and copy the emotional reactions of those adults (e.g., 124 
make a negative response following fearful signals) when presented with an unfamiliar or strange 125 
toy, as opposed to a familiar toy (Kim & Kwak, 2011). When 18-month-olds face a slope of 126 
intermediate steepness, whether they walk down the slope or remain immobile depends on whether 127 
their mother’s affective signals are positive or negative. Yet if the slope is either unambiguously 128 
gentle or steep, maternal input has little impact on their behavior (Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2008). 129 
Similarly, 5 to 8-year-olds are more likely to endorse category labels that conflict with their own 130 
judgments when their prior knowledge is weak rather than strong (Chan & Tardif, 2013).  131 
 132 
Despite these findings, other studies have found that the confidence ratings of 7-12 year-olds 133 
correlate poorly with accuracy unless children are given feedback to help them calibrate their 134 
ratings (Newman & Wick, 1987). However, recent work with 5-year-olds suggests that the effect of 135 
feedback was not to improve calibration, but simply to prompt children to evaluate how well they 136 
were doing, which they do not do otherwise (Odic et al., 2012). Accordingly, it is clear that young 137 
children are sensitive to whether or not they have received any information but it is less clear 138 
whether they are able to estimate the strength of their information (i.e., how certain they can be) and 139 
whether they can use such estimates to guide their social learning such that their accuracy is 140 
increased. 141 
 142 
There is also good evidence that children can use a consensus to guide their decision-making. For 143 
instance, when given conflicting names for a novel object by two different informants, if two 144 
bystanders signal agreement (via head nods and smiles) with the name supplied by one informant 145 
and disagreement (via head shakes and frowns) with the name supplied by the other informant, 4-146 
year-olds overwhelmingly endorse the name eliciting bystander agreement (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). 147 
Similarly, if three informants all point to the same object as the referent of a novel name whereas a 148 
single informant points to a different object as the referent, 3- and 4-year-olds select the former 149 
when asked to identify the named object (Corriveau et al., 2009). Such sensitivity to informant 150 
agreement is seen in both Western and East Asian children, regardless of the culture of the 151 
informants (Chen et al., 2013). Furthermore, 3- and 4-year-olds, having correctly identified the 152 
biggest line of a trio, will defer to a consensus of three informants who disagree with what the 153 
children can see for themselves (Corriveau & Harris, 2010) at rates similar to those observed in 154 
classic studies of conformity in adults (Asch, 1956; Bond & Smith, 1996). Similarly, 4-year-olds 155 
will defer to an obviously incorrect group of three peers, even if they later revert to their original 156 
decision in the absence of the informants (Haun & Tomasello, 2011). Thus, children often endorse a 157 
consensus when they lack relevant perceptual cues (as in learning names for novel objects) but they 158 
will even do so despite the availability of perceptual cues. Finally, 3-6 year olds copy a behavior 159 
with higher fidelity when shown it performed once by each of two demonstrators than when they 160 
see it performed twice by a single demonstrator (Herrmann et al., 2013). 161 
 162 
Taken together, these findings show that young children are more reliant on the decisions of others 163 
when they feel uncertain and when informants are in agreement. Nevertheless, this body of research 164 
displays two key limitations, which we seek to address. First, the ability of young children to use 165 
uncertainty to successfully guide their use of social information and to improve the accuracy of 166 
their decision-making – a prediction of evolutionary theory – remains unclear. In particular, the 167 
relative certainty of the information made available to children has not been systematically varied. 168 
Second, the degree of consensus has also not been systematically varied, leaving it unclear whether 169 
children can be characterized as conformist, using the strict definition set out above (i.e., 170 
disproportionately sensitive to less than unanimous examples).  171 
 172 
To resolve these questions, we present an experimental study in which children (aged 3 to 7) were 173 
given a task that they first attempted to solve themselves, but were then informed of the decisions of 174 
a group of adults and given the opportunity to revise their decision. We chose a task – selecting the 175 
more numerous of two dot arrays – in which task difficulty could be systematically varied. We also 176 
employed a large number of informants so that the number of informants who agreed/disagreed 177 
with the children’s initial asocial decisions could also be systematically varied. We predicted that, 178 
with age, children’s behavior would approach the adaptive behavior of adults expected by cultural 179 
evolutionary theory, with children becoming more adept at using uncertainty and consensus to 180 
guide decision-making with age. Specifically, we predicted that, with age, children would 181 
increasingly show the conformist transmission pattern defined by Boyd and Richerson (1985). 182 
Thus, we anticipated that older, but not younger, children would show an exaggerated receptivity to 183 
a less than unanimous majority. 184 
 185 
Methods 186 
 187 
General Methods 188 
 189 
Children took part in a computer-based, two-alternative forced-choice game using asocial and social 190 
information to make relative quantity judgments concerning pairs of arrays of dots. Children gained 191 
asocial information through direct observation of the arrays, and social information by watching a 192 
video of 10 adult informants. Each child completed 5 trials, taking 5 minutes, and was rewarded 193 
with a sticker for taking part, irrespective of their performance. 194 
 195 
Participants & Apparatus 196 
 197 
122 children (55 males) took part, aged between 2 years 11 months and 8 years 11 months (mean 198 
age = 5 years 7 months, median = 5 years 5 months). The experiment took part in the “Discovery 199 
Center” in the Museum of Science, Boston, and children were recruited from visiting families. 200 
Children played the game individually, although a parent/guardian was present throughout. 201 
 202 
The Task 203 
 204 
We used the “who-has-more” two-alternative, forced-choice, numerical discrimination task in 205 
which the child briefly sees two arrays of dots (each array belonging to a television character; Big 206 
Bird or Grover) and must decide who has more dots (see Fig. 1a). This task was used because 207 
previous work has established that the difficulty of the task for young children varies with the 208 
degree of similarity between the number of dots that each character has (Halberda & Feigenson, 209 
2008). This can be expressed as a dot ratio, calculated as the difference between the numbers of 210 
dots each character has, divided by the lesser number. For example, given 15 versus 25 dots, the dot 211 
ratio would be 0.66. As the dot ratio tends to 0, the trial becomes increasingly difficult. In adults, 212 
confidence ratings associated with decisions are robustly related to difficulty, with decisions on 213 
more difficult trials made with lower confidence (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). Young children 214 
have also been shown to be sensitive to their performance, but only when prompted by the presence 215 
of feedback (and irrespective of the accuracy of the feedback itself) (Odic et al., 2012). Thus, we 216 
inferred that, if feedback in the form of the decisions of informants was sufficient to cause children 217 
assess their state of knowledge, their uncertainty would vary across trials, depending on the dot 218 
ratio. 219 
 220 
On each trial, each character had a random number of dots between 10 and 30 such that the dot ratio 221 
was between 0 and 1 (although there was always at least 1 dot difference between the two 222 
characters). The minimum of 10 dots was used because for numbers >10, dot ratio correlates with 223 
difficulty, whereas for lower numbers (<5) individuals use different enumeration mechanisms 224 
(Lipton & Spelke, 2004; Feigenson & Carey, 2005; Carey, 2009). The location of each dot on its 225 
panel was randomized, no dots overlapped and the dot arrays were shown for 3.5s. We resized dots 226 
using an area anti-correlation procedure to prevent total area being a reliable cue to number 227 
(Halberda & Feigenson, 2008). Using this procedure, each trial had a 0.5 chance of being anti area-228 
correlated in which case the relationship between the number of dots and the total area was reversed 229 
such that if one character had twice as many dots as the other character, the sum of their dots' areas 230 
was half that of the other character's dots. Additionally, the diameter of each individual dot was 231 
multiplied by a number drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 0.65 to 1.35 to add 232 
variation in size. 233 
 234 
The Social Information 235 
 236 
The social information was presented as a video of 10 informants, a random subset of whom 237 
claimed that Big Bird had more dots, whilst the others claimed that Grover had more dots (see Fig. 238 
1b). During each video, a voice-over asked the informants if they thought each character had more 239 
dots (e.g., “Who thinks Grover has more? … ... Who thinks Big Bird has more?”). At each asking, 240 
the informants who agreed with the voice-over nodded (a signal children are known to recognize) 241 
(Fusaro & Harris, 2013) and raised their right hand, whilst the others looked down and remained 242 
still in order to signal disagreement. We made 4 videos for each of the 11 possible levels of 243 
consensus (from 0 to 10 of the informants supporting each option, totaling 44 videos) with the 244 
spatial location of informants varying across videos such that each informant did not occupy a 245 
consistent location. All the informants were women and wore identical purple t-shirts without any 246 
identifying items (e.g., glasses). The intention was that children playing the game would not be able 247 
to recognize any informants across trials to prevent them from trusting specific individuals.  248 
 249 
Procedure 250 
 251 
Children joined the experimenter in the experimental area of the “Discovery Center”. The 252 
experimenter explained how to play the game to children and then guided them through it, without 253 
leading their decision-making. For each trial, the child was first shown the dots (see Fig. 1a), after 254 
which the child was asked which character they thought had more dots. Following their initial 255 
decision, a randomly selected video was played to provide social information (see Fig. 1b). Note 256 
that because each video was randomly selected, children’s initial asocial decision was sometimes 257 
endorsed by a majority of the informants and sometimes rejected – no matter whether that initial 258 
decision was wrong or right. After the video, children made a second, final decision and the trial 259 
was complete. The experimenter did not give children feedback on their final decisions during the 260 
experiment, both to see if children would assess their uncertainty without direct feedback, but also 261 
to avoid confidence hysteresis (Odic et al., 2012). After all 5 trials, a final screen congratulated the 262 
child, informing them they had done "really well" (irrespective of the child's actual performance), 263 
they were given a sticker and the experiment finished. 264 
 265 
Analysis 266 
 267 
We analysed the data with two Bayesian generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs), modelling the 268 
performance of children following asocial and all information respectively, using Monte Carlo 269 
Markov Chain (MCMC) methods to estimate parameter values in OpenBUGS 3.2.1 (Lunn & 270 
Spiegelhalter, 2009; for a more detailed description of this approach, see Ntzoufras, 2009; for an 271 
accessible introduction to Bayesian methods for developmentalists, see van de Schoot et al., 2014) . 272 
In this approach, several chains of values (Markov chains) are created for each parameter estimated 273 
by the model (we used 3 per parameter). Starting from arbitrary points, the chains converge and 274 
produce values according to the probability that they are the true value of the parameter. A large 275 
sample of these values is collected (we collected >3000 per parameter), the median value of which 276 
can be considered the most likely estimate of the parameter. The uncertainty in this estimate is 277 
presented as a central credible interval (comparable to a confidence interval). The 95% central 278 
credible interval, for example, is the range of the sample excluding the top and bottom 2.5% of 279 
values, and there is a 95% chance that the true value of the parameter lies within this interval. A 280 
95% central credible interval that does not include 0 has a similar implication to a p-value <0.05 281 
and we will describe this as strong evidence for that parameter having an effect. Although Bayesian 282 
approaches allow the combination of prior information with new data, to avoid the possibility that 283 
the deliberate selection of prior information could influence the results we used extremely vague 284 
priors throughout, (see Supporting Information 1). Our final model was constructed by starting with 285 
a maximally complex model and removing all parameters for which the 90% central credible 286 
interval included 0 (i.e., parameters for which there was a <90% probability of an effect). Unless 287 
otherwise stated, all graphs show median estimates and their 95% central credible intervals. For an 288 
illustration of how well our model was able to fit the data see Supporting Information 2.  289 
 290 
We used this approach for several reasons. Firstly, our analysis incorporates several simultaneously 291 
varying parameters, some of which were modelled as linear (e.g., age, trial ratio) and others as 292 
categorical (e.g., sex), as well as random individual level effects. For this type of analysis MCMC 293 
methods are recommended (Bolker et al., 2009). Secondly, the flexibility of the approach allowed 294 
us to build a model specifically tailored to the experiment that we carried out, for example, by 295 
including a parameter specifically testing for conformist transmission. Thirdly, p-values and 296 
confidence intervals produced by frequencist GLMMs are only approximations and are unlikely to 297 
be accurate without a very large dataset. Although MCMC methods also involve approximation, the 298 
accuracy of the approximation does not depend on the size of the dataset and these methods readily 299 
give very accurate approximations provided enough values are generated from the chains. Finally, 300 
analyses of this type can be used to generate quantitative expectations for children’s behaviour 301 
under all conditions modelled (e.g., what is the probability a child makes the correct initial decision 302 
given that trial ratio = 0.5 and they are 4 years 7 months old?). These estimates can be highly 303 
instructive in interpreting the values of parameters in the model and they are the values we show in 304 
our figures. 305 
 306 
For some illustrative means and standard deviations of the raw data, see Tables 1-3. As a test of the 307 
robustness of our finding, we repeated all analyses excluding data from children below 4 years old. 308 
This did not change our findings and so here we report results of the analysis involving all children. 309 
For a comparison of the results with and without data from children below 4 years old, see the 310 
Supporting Information.  311 
 312 
Asocial Performance 313 
 314 
We modelled the probability that a child's initial decision (prior to receiving social information) 315 
would be correct (p1) as a Bernoulli variable (appropriate for binary data, in this case correct=1 and 316 
incorrect=0) and logit link function (which translates the probability of success into a continuous 317 
linear predictor). The linear predictor contained a baseline value (β1), a function of dot ratio (DR), 318 
and an effect of which side of the screen the character with the most dots was displayed on, such 319 
that: 320 
 321 
 logit(p1) = β1 + DR + β2*side of screen, (1) 322 
 323 
where β1,2 are coefficients, the values of which were estimated by the analysis. The function of dot 324 
ratio (DR) included age, sex, whether the trial was area-correlated or not and random individual 325 
level effects, such that: 326 
 327 
 DR = dot ratio*(β3 + β4*age + β5*sex + β6*area correlation + individual effects), (2) 328 
 329 
where β3,4,5,6 are coefficients, the values of which were estimated by the analysis. Accordingly, the 330 
complete model is: 331 
 332 
 logit(p1) = β1 + dot ratio*(β3 + β4*age + β5*sex + β6*area correlation + individual effects) +  333 
 β2*side of screen, (3) 334 
 335 
The calculation of DR allows the effect of dot ratio on performance to depend upon age, sex, area-336 
correlation and individual. The baseline value (β1) is intended to check the success of the model; a 337 
non-zero value of β1 would indicate that the function of dot ratio cannot fully explain children’s 338 
performance. The value of logit(p1) can be considered as a measure of the asocial information 339 
children were able to collect. The greater the magnitude of this value, the more certain children 340 
should feel in their decision. The screen side effect allows children, as a group, to have a bias 341 
towards choosing the character on a particular side of the screen. As part of the backwards 342 
elimination procedure, the following parameters were removed from the final model: the screen side 343 
bias, the baseline value, the interaction between area correlation and dot ratio and the interaction 344 
between sex and dot ratio (i.e., β1,2,5,6=0). This left the final model as: 345 
 346 
 logit(p1) = dot ratio*(β3 + β4*age + individual effects), (4) 347 
 348 
 349 
Social Performance 350 
 351 
Next, we modeled the probability that a child's final decision (after receiving social information) 352 
would be correct (p2) as a Bernoulli variable (1=correct, 0=incorrect) and logit link function. The 353 
linear predictor contained additive effects of the child’s asocial information (i.e., logit(p1), which 354 
interacted with age), the child’s initial decision (1=correct, 0=incorrect, which interacted with age) 355 
and a function of the social information the child had received (SI, which interacted with age, sex, 356 
dot ratio and random individual level effects), such that: 357 
 358 
logit(p2) = (β7 + β8*age)*logit(p1) + (β9 + β10*age)*initial decision +(β11 + β12*age + β13*sex +  359 
 β14*dot ratio + individual effects)*SI, (5) 360 
 361 
where β7:14 are coefficients, the values of which were estimated by the model. Including children’s 362 
asocial information takes into account the differing levels of accuracy across ages and individuals, 363 
and is a measure of how certain children should be in their judgments. The effect of the child’s 364 
initial decision serves as a measure of children’s tendency to stick with their initial decision, 365 
regardless of the asocial information in its favor. The effect of the social information was calculated 366 
such that: 367 
 368 
 SI = qs/(qs+(1-q)s) – 0.5, (6) 369 
 370 
where q is the proportion of informants who are correct and s is the shape parameter, which 371 
interacted with age, such that: 372 
 373 
 s =  exp(β15 +  β16*age), (7) 374 
 375 
where β15,16 are coefficients, the values of which were estimated by the analysis. SI = 0 when there 376 
is no majority (q=0.5, i.e., 5vs.5 informants). If the value of the shape parameter (s) is greater than 377 
1, the response to the degree of consensus is conformist as defined earlier.  If it is less than 1, the 378 
response to the degree of consensus is anti-conformist (for graphs of this function see Supporting 379 
Information 3). If the value equals 1, then the response to consensus is proportional to the relative 380 
size of the majority. The following parameters were removed from the final model: the interaction 381 
between age and the asocial information, and the interactions between sex and SI, dot ratio and SI 382 
and age and SI (i.e., β8,12,13,14=0). This left the final model as: 383 
 384 
 logit(p2) = β7*logit(p1) + (β9 + β10*age)*initial decision + (β11 + individual effects)* SI, (9) 385 
 386 
Results 387 
 388 
Asocial Performance 389 
 390 
After receiving only asocial information, children performed much better on trials with a high (i.e., 391 
easier) rather than low dot ratio (β3 = 3.16, [2.53, 3.95]) and the gradient of this improvement 392 
increased with age (β4 = 0.89, [0.50, 1.38], see Fig. 2a). This means that although children 4 years 393 
and up clearly perform above chance at higher dot ratios, the evidence that 3-year-olds do so is 394 
weaker (see Fig. 2a). There was no evidence of a difference in performance between girls and boys 395 
(β5 = -0.15, [-1.26, 0.96]) and only very weak evidence that area correlation helped performance (β6 396 
= 0.75, [-0.19, 1.71]). There was also no baseline performance independent of dot ratio (β1 = 0.25, 397 
[-0.13, 0.62]) suggesting that the effect of dot ratio and its interactions were able to account for 398 
performance. Children did not, as a group, show a side preference (β2 = -0.13, [-0.34, 0.08]). 399 
Finally, there was considerable individual variation in asocial performance (precision of population 400 
distribution: 0.33, [0.14, 1.32]). 401 
 402 
Social Performance 403 
 404 
There is strong evidence that children’s asocial information had less-than-expected influence when 405 
children made their final decision, consistent with them forgetting or undervaluing this initial 406 
information (β7 = 0.29, [0.11, 0.50]. Thus, children displayed only a relatively weak increment in 407 
their tendency to stick with their initial decision on trials with a high (i.e., easier) as opposed to a 408 
low dot ratio; compare gradient of lines in Fig. 2b with Fig. 2a). Moreover, this weak impact of 409 
asocial information did not appear to change with age (β8 = 0.10, [-0.03, 0.24]). In addition to the 410 
somewhat muted effect of asocial information, children also showed a blunt tendency to “stick” 411 
with their initial decision (β9 = 1.96, [1.30, 2.61]), a tendency that increased with age (β10 = 0.68, 412 
[0.25, 1.12], see Fig.2b). The effect of asocial information and the sticking tendency are additive, 413 
such that children are less likely to change their mind on easier trials (in which they are likely to 414 
have collected more asocial information). Nevertheless, when considered across all cases, children 415 
show an overall tendency to stick with their initial decision. 416 
 417 
Finally, despite their overall tendency to stick with their initial decision, children were clearly 418 
influenced by the information provided by the informants (β11 = 0.32, [0.21, 0.53], see Fig. 2c). 419 
Their response to total majorities (i.e. when all 10 informants unanimously agreed with their initial 420 
asocial decision or unanimously disagreed with that decision) was considerable, and did not change 421 
with age (β12 = 0.05, [-0.02, 0.05]), sex (β13 = 0.05, [-0.17, 0.29]) or dot ratio (β14 = 0.11, [-0.17, 422 
0.40]). However, their response to lower levels of consensus (i.e., less than unanimity) did change 423 
with age (β15 = -0.84, [-1.49, 0.14], β16 = 1.00, [0.62, 1.50]); children under 6 were 'anti-conformist', 424 
being relatively insensitive to the presence of less than unanimous majorities; 6-year-olds displayed 425 
a proportionate response, the extent to which the informants biased them towards a particular option 426 
was linearly related to the number of informants choosing that option; 7-year-olds were conformist, 427 
displaying a disproportionate response to less than unanimous majorities (see Fig. 2d).  Thus, there 428 
is a marked age change. Whilst, three year-olds do not distinguish between any intermediate levels 429 
of consensus and are only influenced by total majorities, 7-year-olds, by contrast, do distinguish 430 
between differing levels of consensus and less than unanimous majorities have a relatively large 431 
influence. 432 
 433 
There was little individual variation in the response to social information (precision of population 434 
distribution: 11.0, [3.37, 31.8]). 435 
 436 
Discussion 437 
 438 
Asocial Performance 439 
 440 
Our results provide good evidence that the experiment worked as intended, with children beginning 441 
to perform above chance from age 3, and accuracy increasing with both dot ratio and age, as has 442 
been found elsewhere (Halberda & Feigenson, 2008). Such findings are intuitively plausible 443 
because dot ratio corresponds to trial discriminability (the easiness of the trial) and because the 444 
ability to discriminate is likely to increase with age. Furthermore, all effects remaining in the model 445 
dealing with the initial decision were part of the function of dot ratio, which suggests that our model 446 
was able to explain the variation in performance well. It is of note that there was only very weak 447 
evidence for an interaction between area-correlation and ratio, suggesting that children were able to 448 
see past the area covered by dots and focus solely on the number of dots. We also find convincing 449 
evidence that there is no gender difference in performance on our task. 450 
 451 
Consensus 452 
 453 
The social information had a large effect on children of all ages. In the hypothetical absence of prior 454 
information, a child of any age exposed to a total majority (i.e., 10 v 0) has a 90% chance of 455 
endorsing the judgment of that total majority (see Figure 2d). However, the shape of the response to 456 
the consensus amongst informants changed sharply with age. Children aged 3-4 showed strong anti-457 
conformism; total majorities had a strong effect, but levels of consensus that were less than totally 458 
unanimous had no systematic effect on their judgments. (Note, our use of the term 'anti-conformist' 459 
does not imply that young children exhibit a preference for minority positions, or a tendency to 460 
rebel and is descriptive as opposed to mechanistic). Children aged 6 showed a broadly proportionate 461 
response; the probability of their being swayed by a less than unanimous majority was 462 
proportionate to the relative size of the majority.  Finally, children aged 7 were conformist; they 463 
showed an enlarged or disproportionate response to non-total majorities (although not as strong as 464 
their response to a total majority). The conformism of 7 year olds corresponds very closely to the 465 
adaptive decision-making mechanism predicted by the theoretical cultural evolution literature 466 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Nakahashi et al., 2012; Kandler & Laland, 2013). Moreover, it is the 467 
same response to a consensus that is seen in empirical studies of adults (Morgan et al., 2011).  468 
 469 
We can think of two possible explanations for children’s increasing sensitivity to a less than 470 
unanimous majority: reflecting children’s improving numerical abilities, or, alternatively, their 471 
developing appreciation of how to respond in the face of disagreement among informants. 472 
According to the first interpretation, children’s developing ability to count the number of informants 473 
who agreed or disagreed with their initial asocial decision led to their placing increasing weight on 474 
the size of the majority with age. However, close inspection of the data suggests that this account is 475 
unlikely. Note that 3-4 year olds responded similarly to any kind of disagreement among the 476 
informants; for example, they responded similarly whether nine of the ten informants agreed with 477 
their initial response or disagreed with their initial response. Yet, it is unlikely that younger children 478 
were unable to register that the majority (of nine) was numerically greater than the minority (of one) 479 
(Halberda & Feigenson, 2008). We believe that the second interpretation is more plausible. We may 480 
assume that all children, no matter what their age, were sensitive to whether there was a unanimous 481 
majority that agreed versus disagreed with their initial decision. Indeed, inspection of Figure 2d 482 
confirms that children in all five age groups sharply differentiated between these two cases, 483 
typically sticking to their initial decision following unanimous agreement and switching their initial 484 
decision following unanimous disagreement. Thus, developmental change is limited to cases when 485 
the informants disagreed. A plausible interpretation is that children develop an increasingly nuanced 486 
response to such disagreement. More specifically, 3-4 year-olds respond in a simple all-or-none 487 
fashion; they register whether or not there is disagreement but if it is present they ignore its 488 
direction and its magnitude. Thus, having registered any level of disagreement among the 489 
informants they are unsure whether to stick or switch. By the age of 6 years, children display a 490 
proportionate reaction; their tendency to stick or switch is calibrated to both the direction and 491 
magnitude of the majority. Finally, older children, notably 7-year-olds begin to treat all majorities 492 
in a similar fashion, so that, for example a majority of 7 to 3 is likely to impact their final decision 493 
almost as much as a majority of 9 to 1. The broader implication of this interpretation is that young 494 
children become disproportionately sensitive to the existence of a majority. The finding that 495 
conformist transmission appears at age 7, whereas many biases in trust appear considerably earlier, 496 
suggests that conformist transmission, at least in humans, relies on a comparatively complex 497 
appraisal of disagreement among informants. Accordingly, a prediction of this interpretation is that 498 
conformist transmission should be limited in its taxonomic distribution. Consistent with this, there 499 
is currently little evidence for conformist transmission in nonhuman animals (Hoppitt & Laland, 500 
2013). 501 
 502 
Other nuanced social behaviors also develop across a similar age range. For example, 3- and 4-year-503 
olds do not discriminate between two choices with identical rewards to themselves, but different 504 
payoffs to a partner. However, above the age of 5, children do discriminate and also show 505 
contingent reciprocity in rewarding partners who previously behaved cooperatively but punishing 506 
those who did not (House et al., 2013). Similarly, although children between the ages of 3 and 8 507 
endorse norms for sharing, only 7- and 8-year-olds actually share when the opportunity arises. 508 
Younger children even predict that they will not share, ruling out the possibility that their lack of 509 
sharing is due to a last-minute failure of willpower (Smith et al., 2013). These results, along with 510 
our own, illustrate an increasing social modulation of behavior between the ages of 3 and 8. Whilst 511 
the behaviors described are sufficiently dissimilar to make it unlikely that they are underpinned by 512 
the same cognitive mechanisms, they nonetheless have qualitative similarities, similar 513 
developmental trajectories and may be influenced by similar experiential factors. Collectively they 514 
illustrate a general increase in the complexity of children’s social behavior. 515 
 516 
Uncertainty 517 
 518 
We varied trial difficulty in order to manipulate children’s uncertainty – a variable predicted by 519 
cultural evolutionary theory to influence social learning and observed to do so in adults as well as 520 
non-human species (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; van Bergen et al., 2004; Morgan et al., 2011). 521 
However, going against this prediction, we found that children show little sensitivity to the 522 
magnitude of their initial asocial information when making their final decision (see Fig. 2b). 523 
Furthermore, there was only very weak evidence that their sensitivity to that magnitude increases 524 
with age, suggesting it was not part of a developmental trajectory. This suggests that children were 525 
not accurately monitoring their own initial uncertainty. In the context of other work which found 526 
that children only assessed their own performance when prompted to do so by the presence of 527 
feedback (Newman & Wick, 1987; Odic et al., 2012), a possible explanation is that the indirect 528 
feedback from informants did not trigger such evaluation. However, going against this 529 
interpretation, similar behavior has also been observed in adults. For example, although adults are 530 
known to copy others depending on their own confidence (Morgan et al., 2011), their confidence is 531 
imperfectly related to accuracy (Morgan et al., 2011; Luna & Martín-Luengo, 2012). Accordingly, 532 
the weak effect of prior asocial information that we found could be the result of children 533 
inaccurately translating their asocial information into confidence. Perhaps the most plausible 534 
interpretation is some combination of the two; both adults and children are imperfect estimators of 535 
their certainty, but children are the poorer of the two, particularly if not prompted to evaluate their 536 
state of knowledge. A direct comparison between children and adults would be able to quantify this 537 
difference and may yet identify developmental changes. 538 
 539 
In addition to the diminished effect of asocial information, children also show a tendency to “stick” 540 
with their initial decision. Unlike the effect of asocial information, the sticking tendency does 541 
change across childhood, becoming more powerful with age. For three year-olds it is sufficiently 542 
weak as to be negligible. Above this age, however, it becomes an increasingly powerful influence 543 
(see Fig. 2b). Again, similar patterns can be observed in the behavior of adults, where numerous 544 
experiments have documented that adults consistently give greater weight to their own decisions 545 
than they do to the decisions of others (Yaniv, 2004; Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Weizsäcker, 2010; 546 
Mesoudi, 2011; Soll & Mannes, 2011). There are several possible explanations for this 547 
developmental change. For example, a developing understanding of third parties having false 548 
beliefs or a desire to deceive the observer could lead children to increasingly rely on their own 549 
opinions. Another possible explanation is that children could inflate their sense of their own ability, 550 
over-riding the opinions of others, in order to maintain a positive self-image. Both these 551 
possibilities are considered in the adult literature (Soll & Mannes, 2011), and further work is 552 
necessary to understand the role they play in the development of the sticking tendency that we have 553 
observed. 554 
 555 
Concluding Remarks 556 
 557 
A central prediction of this work, derived from Cultural Evolutionary theory, is that social learning 558 
should become more adaptive with age. The increasing strength of a sticking tendency might seem 559 
to contradict this, but direct examination of children’s performance shows that, even with this 560 
increasing sticking tendency, the adaptive value of social learning increases across childhood (see 561 
Figs. 3a and b), with the sticking tendency of over 5s being overcome by their increased sensitivity 562 
to non-total majorities. Thus, the behavior of 7 year-olds may not be optimal, but it is more adaptive 563 
than that of 3-4 year-olds and, as described above, it shows marked similarities to adult behavior. 564 
 565 
A possible criticism of our design is that, because children always heard from the informants, we 566 
cannot differentiate between children changing their mind due to social influence or due to doubt 567 
about their initial decision. However, the experiment did include cases where the informants were 568 
equally divided (i.e., 5vs.5).  Accordingly any change in the rate of switching when presented with 569 
a greater level of consensus than an equal split can be appropriately attributed to social influence. 570 
Such differences can be seen by comparing figures 3d (which shows the response to 5vs.5 571 
informants) and c (which shows the response to 8 of the informants disagreeing with the child). In 572 
this case, for children under 6, the rate of switching is unchanged (this is to be expected given that 573 
children under 6 show little sensitivity to variation in the size of non-total majorities). By contrast, 574 
children over 6 (who are sensitive to non-total majorities) show an increase in switching, 575 
particularly on the harder trials. Accordingly, we can be confident that the decisions of the 576 
informants did influence children’s behavior. 577 
 578 
In sum, the effect of asocial and social information on children's decision-making changes with age 579 
towards the adaptive (though not optimal) decision-making mechanisms observed in adults. Three-580 
year-olds’ judgments are indistinguishable from random behavior unless they are presented with a 581 
total (i.e., unanimous) majority in which case they are very likely to follow the informants. By age 582 
6, children display a more nuanced pattern. They perform above chance, recall their previous 583 
decision and are biased in its favor even if the trial is extremely hard. They also switch or stick 584 
strategically depending on the size of the majority favoring one or the other. By age 7, children 585 
exhibit an adult-like pattern of disproportionate responding to a non-total majority. Overall, the 586 
findings show that the mechanism for incorporating social information into decision-making is 587 
initially very blunt and only sensitive to overwhelming social signals. Across the course of early 588 
childhood, however, it increasingly responds to small majorities, converging on those learning 589 
mechanisms observed in adults and predicted by Cultural Evolutionary theory. 590 
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Figure Legend: 736 
 737 
Figure 1 738 
 739 
a) The “who-has-more” task. Children were given a 3.5s viewing of the dots after which they were 740 
required to decide who had more. In this case, Big Bird has more. b) The social information. After 741 
making an initial decision, children saw the decisions of 10 adult informants who were asked by a 742 
voice-over whether they thought each character had the most dots. In the still shown, three of the 743 
informants are agreeing with the character being suggested by the voice over. 744 
 745 
  746 
Figure 2 747 
 748 
Figures show median estimates (solid lines), and 95% central credible intervals (dashed lines). (a) 749 
Children's performance improved with dot ratio and with age. Six- and 7-year-olds start to hit 750 
ceiling performance at intermediate dot ratios, whilst there is not strong evidence that three-year-751 
olds perform above chance levels. (b) The probability that a child sticks with their initial decision 752 
for the case of 5v5 informants (i.e., no net social influence), such that whether or not a child sticks 753 
is based solely upon their asocial information and sticking tendency. Children showed a blunt 754 
tendency to stick with their initial decision across all dot ratios and hence irrespective of their 755 
asocial information. This tendency to stick increased with age; 7-year-olds always have a >80% 756 
chance of sticking, whilst the behavior of 3-year-olds is consistent with sticking or switching at 757 
random. Nevertheless, children did show some sensitivity to how much asocial information they 758 
had collected, being more likely to stick on trials with a high, as opposed to low dot ratio. (c) The 759 
probability that children stick with their initial decision for a trial with the intermediate dot ratio of 760 
1.5. Three- and 4-year-olds are only affected by social information when there is unanimity 761 
amongst informants. However, 6- and 7-year-olds show a more nuanced response to social 762 
information and respond differently to the various possible levels of consensus in non-total 763 
majorities. (d) The response of children to social information alone (i.e., statistically controlling for 764 
asocial information). The black dotted line has a gradient of 1 (representing unbiased copying) and 765 
is for comparison with the other lines. Three-, 4- and 5-year-olds are anti-conformist in that they are 766 
at least somewhat insensitive to non-total majorities. Six-year-olds show a roughly proportionate 767 
response to the size of the majority. Seven-year-olds, by contrast, are conformist in that they show 768 
an over-proportionate sensitivity to small majorities. 769 
 770 
  771 
Figure 3 772 
 773 
Figures show median estimates (solid lines), and 95% central credible intervals (dashed lines). (a) 774 
Given that 8 out of the 10 informants give the correct answer, with age children were increasingly 775 
able to take advantage of the social information to improve their accuracy, particularly on the more 776 
difficult trials. For easier trials, the increase in performance due to social information was similar 777 
across ages. However, this is because on such trials older children are close to ceiling performance 778 
and so there is little room for further improvement. (b) In support of this, 7-year-olds nearly 779 
maximized their performance following social information, particularly on easier trials, whereas 3-780 
year-olds take minimal advantage of the social information. (c) This graph is shows the effect of 8 781 
out of the 10 informants disagreeing with the child on the probability the child switches. With age, 782 
children become more likely to switch following conflicting social information on more difficult 783 
trials relative to less difficult trials. Three-year-olds (in the absence of a total majority) are no more 784 
likely to stick than to switch, irrespective of trial difficulty. (d) This graph shows the effect of social 785 
information without a majority (i.e., 5v5 informants) on the probability a child switches. With age 786 
children are still more likely to change their decision on more difficult trials relative to less difficult 787 
trials. This tendency is much smaller than when the informants disagree with the children (panel c) 788 
and is likely due children doubting their decisions on harder questions. The extent to which this 789 
sensitivity to difficulty dictates switching matches the extent to which difficulty affects asocial 790 
performance (figure 2a).  791 
 792 
  793 
Table 1. 794 
Dot 
ratio 
Initial 
Accuracy 
mean s.d. 
0-0.2 0.69 0.46 
0.2-0.4 0.64 0.48 
0.4-0.6 0.84 0.36 
0.6-0.8 0.84 0.37 
0.8-1.0 0.86 0.35 
 795 
  796 
 797 
Table 2. 798 
 799 
Age Initial accuracy Switch* Final accuracy** 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
3 0.71 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.53 0.5 
4 0.69 0.46 0.42 0.5 0.68 0.47 
5 0.78 0.41 0.36 0.49 0.79 0.41 
6 0.79 0.41 0.4 0.5 0.88 0.33 
7 0.91 0.28 0.6 0.5 0.91 0.3 
  800 
 801 
Table 3. 802 
Proportion of informants 
who disagree 
Switch 
mean s.d. 
0-0.2 0.12 0.33 
0.2-0.4 0.23 0.42 
0.4-0.6 0.29 0.46 
0.6-0.8 0.47 0.5 
0.8-1 0.59 0.49 
 803 
 804 
Tables 1-3. Raw data averages, followed by standard deviations, for a range of variables for 805 
comparison with our model results. Key: Initial Accuracy = the probability a child’s initial answer 806 
(prior to hearing from the informants) was correct; Switch = the probability a child’s final answer 807 
was different to their initial answer; Final Accuracy = the probability a child’s final answer (after 808 
hearing from the informants) was correct. Note that because the experiment involved several 809 
simultaneously varying factors and collected multiple data points from each child, we do not 810 
recommend relying on the numbers in these tables over those displayed in the graphs. *Given that a 811 
majority, but not all, of the informants disagreed with the child. **Given that the majority of 812 
informants gave the correct response. 813 
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